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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE INFORMATION
AGE: THE TERRORIST FINANCE
TRACKING PROGRAM
HANNAH C. BLOCH-WEHBA*
Europe has long been deemed "more protective" of privacy than the
United States. In the context of transatlantic cooperation in the war on
terrorism, divergences in privacy law and policy have become ever more ap-
parent. As has always been the case, the same technologies that pose new
and vital privacy issues with regard to personal information and private
data are those that are important sources for government actors, including
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Despite the increasing reliance by
national agencies on information flowing from other nations, regulation of
information transfer, processing and sharing has been achieved largely
outside of the international sphere.
This Note argues that the use of personal information in the national
security setting offers a new and important look at the functions and limita-
tions of global governance in the information age. Exploring the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program (TfTP), a joint initiative among European
states and the United States, within the framework of Global Administrative
Law (GAL), I argue that common accounts of differences between U.S. and
European law on privacy issues do not explain the very real tensions at
stake in the TFFP. I show that the TFTP is a real effort at constituting a
soft-law mechanism to manage privacy and security in the information age,
and argue that it fails to embody those values of transparency, participa-
tion, legality, and accountability to which we generally hold GAL mecha-
nisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury began using administrative subpoenas to compel
the disclosure of millions of records from SWIFT, a Belgian
banking consortium, in an initiative known as the Terrorist Fi-
nance Tracking Program (TFTP). After the existence of the
program came to light in 2006,' the Council of Europe
reached an interim deal with the United States to continue
sharing the bank data; the European Parliament vetoed the
deal, complaining that it violated European law. The TFTP,
said Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the rapporteur on the issue,
"must be considered as a departure from European law and
practice in how law enforcement agencies would acquire indi-
viduals' financial records for law enforcement activities,
namely individual court-approved warrants or subpoenas to ex-
amine specific transactions instead of relying on broad admin-
istrative subpoenas for millions of records."2 As a result of the
European Parliament vote, U.S. access to European bank data
"went dark" for several months, until a revised deal was
reached in summer 2010.3
1. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret To
Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/
23/washington/23intel.html.
2. Draft Recommendation on the Proposal for a Council Decision on
the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the European Union and the
United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Mes-
saging Data from the European Union to the United States for Purposes of
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, EUR. PARL. Doc. A7-0013 (2010).
3. Agreement Between the United States of America and the European
Union on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from
the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program, U.S.-E.U.,June 28, 2010, available at http://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-Finance-
Tracking/Documents/Final-TFTP-Agreement-Signed.pdf.
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In drawing a distinction between U.S. and European pol-
icy on this issue, Hennis-Plasschaert was signaling to long-run-
ning disputes between the two powers revolving around data
privacy. The enactment of the Data Protection Directive in
1995 would have prevented data transfers to the United States
were it not for the Safe Harbor agreement that was eventually
effectuated.5 More recently, in the context of the war on ter-
rorism, the European Union reached an agreement with the
United States on the sharing of airline passenger data, or "Pas-
senger Name Records," only to have that agreement annulled
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006. Although in-
tra-European disputes over the Passenger Name Records
agreement centered on the protection of personal data, the
ECJ did not decide whether the protection of personal data
that it offered was sufficient, rather holding that the agree-
ment needed parliamentary approval.6 Indeed, in the SWIFT
case, new powers under the Lisbon Treaty to pass on issues of
police and judiciary cooperation certainly empowered the
European Parliament to take a principled stand against data
sharing.7
In contrast, as technology has changed, it has become in-
creasingly easy for American law enforcement authorities to
obtain personal information for use in a criminal investigation
without first seeking a warrant.8 Although Congress and state
4. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
5. See Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOv, http://export.gov/
safeharbor/eu/index.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (introducing the Safe
Harbor framework).
6. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities,
2006 E.C.R. 14795 111 67-70.
7. Pre-Lisbon, criminal matters were essentially beyond the ambit of Eu-
ropean Union law. Case C-176/03, Commission of the European Communi-
ties v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. 1-7907 1 47 ("[N]either
criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community's
competence.").
8. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (finding no warrant nec-
essary for pen register recording numbers dialed from home phone because
this does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding no Fourth
Amendment interest in the relevant bank records); and United States v.
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legislatures have acted to pass legislation that protects privacy
in various sectors, no general principle that consumers "own"
their information exists in U.S. law.9 The legal scenario with
regard to personal data protection is thus very different from
that in Europe.
Because the SWIFT case stands at the intersection of two
vital areas of European-American cooperation-data transfers
and counterterrorism-it is a hard case to understand, yet a
vital one. A realist analyzing the case might argue that it is a
classic example of bickering over the appropriate balance be-
tween privacy and security, made all the more potent by the
implications for trans-Atlantic cooperation in the pursuit of
terrorists.10 Viewed more generously, the TFITP must be un-
derstood in the context of its integral role in the European
data-protection framework as an illustrative example of the
tensions at play in European data privacy law. On this reading,
the European awareness of "the impact of new technologies,
the fact that we are now living in a 'globalised' world," is at the
root of disputes over data protection." At the same time, the
United States has taken the perspective that while European
integration has propelled data sharing among European
states, it has also hampered similar cooperation between EU
member states and the United States.12 Solutions like the
Jones, 565 U.S. - (2012) (implementing third party doctrine by exempting
categories of "shared" information from the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement).
9. The proliferation of data breach notification laws in state legislatures
is one example of sectoral legislation that acts to protect privacy in some
contexts. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATUREs, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-
breach-notification-laws.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (listing state security
breach notification laws).
10. See, e.g., STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOP-
PING TOMORROW'S TERRORISM 150 (2010) ("[T]he European Union seemed
almost enthusiastic about threatening private companies with sanctions as a
way of attacking U.S. government practices.").
11. Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm'n Responsible for
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Article 29 Working Party "Review of the Data protection legal framework":
Towards a True Single Market of Data Protection (July 14, 2010), http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=SPEECH/10/386&for-
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
12. See, e.g., Scenesetter: FBI Director Mueller's Berlin Visit, Cable from
American Embassy Berlin to FBI and DOJ (Aug. 11, 2006), http://wikileaks.
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TFTP and the Passenger Name Records agreement are at-
tempts to solve the classic problem that emerges from in-
creased international interdependence in the law enforce-
ment arena. Yet in very real ways, these agreements neither
reflect the historical differences in European and American
privacy law, nor do they foster new normative agreement on
these issues.
In this Note, I argue that the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program is best understood not as a "compromise" between
European and American privacy values, but rather as a con-
tested instrument of global administrative law, the result of
two systems competing to achieve the effect of extraterritorial
regulation according to their own domestic norms. Part I of
this Note analyzes the European data protection framework as
an instrument of global administrative law and explores the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program as part of that framework.
I argue that although the European data protection frame-
work seeks to impose European privacy norms on the interna-
tional transfer of data, classical understandings of European
and American privacy law do not explain how and why the two
powers came to the TFTP agreement. Rather, I argue, the di-
vergences between European and U.S. privacy law result from
different statutory approaches that allow European legislators
and regulators to respond much more quickly to technological
change. In light of that fact, I argue in Part II that the TFTP
can be best understood through the lens of global administra-
tive law as implementing procedural and substantive rules to
protect consumer privacy as understood in both Europe and
the United States; however, the program suffers from deeply
flawed approaches to transparency and accountability. Part III
turns to an inquiry about the nature and privacy implications
of large-scale automated data collection in the national secur-
ity setting of both privacy regimes. I explore the growing utility
of large-scale databases and discuss the difficulties and risks of
regulating the bulk transfer of data at the global level.
org/cable/2006/08/06BERLIN2303.html ("While Germany is enhancing
data exchange with its EU partners, the Germans have been reluctant to
consider ways to enhance similar data-sharing with the U.S.").
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I. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW
WORLD
A. The European Data Protection Framework as
Global Administrative Law
Globalization and burgeoning interdependence among
global powers has led to the rise of forms of international gov-
ernance beyond classic treaties and formal agreements. New
institutions of global governance take many forms and serve
many functions, but do not always embody the kinds of checks
and balances served by either formal diplomatic process or by
democratic rule. As a result, questions about democratic legiti-
macy-about accountability, transparency, participation, and
redress-are rife with regard to this new type of institution.'3
Global administrative law (GAL) responds to this phenome-
non by recasting global governance as extant in an intermedi-
ary "global administrative space," in which domestic regulatory
actors interact with international action in ways that are essen-
tially mutually constituting.14 In their seminal article, The Emer-
gence of Global Administrative Law, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stew-
art offered a taxonomy of global governance institutions, sub-
jects, and sources of GAL-and suggested that global
administrative bodies must "meet adequate standards of trans-
parency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and ...
provid[e] effective review of the rules and decisions they
make."15
GAL provides a useful lens through which to examine the
European data protection framework as a whole and the Ter-
rorist Finance Tracking Program as a problematic case of gov-
ernance within that system. By unpacking the institutions op-
erating within a state and closely examining the relationships
with other institutions in other states and at the international
level, GAL promises to "highlight[ ] the extent to which mech-
anisms of procedural participation and review, taken for
granted in domestic administrative action, are lacking on the
global level."' 6
13. Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A
Framework for Analysis, 39 Gov'T & OPPosrIION 336 (2004).
14. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 26 (2005).
15. Id. at 17.
16. Id. at 27.
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Europe's system of regulating data protection has been
described as a "transgovernmental network."17 Statutory pro-
tection of privacy in the European Union embraces a "compre-
hensive" approach, the groundwork for which was laid in the
Council of Europe Convention but the bulk of which stems
from later regulation.18 In 1995, the Data Protection Directive
came into effect with the goal of harmonizing European law
while permitting differences among member states.19 Data
protection legislation at the supranational level inevitably sets
up linkages to national law in that national governments have
their own data protection authorities (in addition to the Euro-
pean Commission's Art. 29 Working Party and the European
Data Protection Supervisor) and their own data protection leg-
islation.20
The significance of the "network" denomination is con-
tested, but insofar as the name serves to distinguish a relatively
informal type of interaction among regulators from state-led
diplomatic initiatives, it has stuck.21 Networks are an "adapta-
ble and decentralized" governance alternative to a classic
17. Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case
of the European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807, 822
(2005).
18. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection:
An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and
Developments, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 11, 13-14 (1999)
(comparing comprehensive and sectoral models of privacy legislation).
19. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, pmbl. ("Whereas, in order
to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of protection of
the rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of such
data must be equivalent in all Member States .... ).
20. See Id. art. 28 (requiring each member state to designate a supervisory
authority). In the German case, for example, the Grundgesetz includes privacy
protections in Articles 2, 10, and 13 (Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I
(Ger.)), the Federal Data Protection Law (Bundesdatenschutzgeetz) sets out
the rights of data subjects and the responsibilities of controllers and proces-
sors, and the individual states each possess data protection authorities to
enforce and implement state data protection laws.
21. Anne-Marie Slaughter is largely credited with developing the concept
of a transgovernmental network. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD OR-
DER (2004). For a different view, see generally Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal
States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L.
183, 211 (2001) (suggesting that the reliance on transgovernmental net-
works is overblown).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2013] 601
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
model of formal intergovernmental treaties or agreements.22
Although networks can operate within a treaty-based frame-
work, they can also exist apart from one;2 3 networks can have
the benefit of establishing law (soft and hard) without the risk
of judicial review by an established tribunal. Of course, this
can also pose dangers to democracy at the domestic and inter-
national levels.24
While the fact that the European data protection system
exists within a statutory and treaty-based framework weighs in
favor of its democratic legitimacy, it faces its own legitimacy
problems at the member state and Union levels.25 The Data
Protection Directive "establish[es] an elaborate sequence of
national and supranational administrative decisions," such
that "national and European administrations share responsi-
bility for a single determination of rights and duties under Eu-
ropean law."2 6 While the Directive was conceived of as a rem-
22. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovern-
mental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4
(2002).
23. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 14, at 21 ("This horizontal form of
administration can, but need not, take place in a treaty framework.").
24. See generally Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravc-
sik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT'L ORGS. 1 (2009) (arguing
that networks governed by formal treaties can actually enhance, not dimin-
ish, domestic democracy).
25. In the closely related issue of data retention, the German Constitu-
tional Court held that Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and
Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 [hereinafter Euro-
pean Data Retention Directive], was unconstitutional as applied to telecom-
munication traffic data. Bundesverfassunsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Consti-
tutional Court], Mar. 2, 2010, 1 Enscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsger-
icht [BVERFGE] 256/08 (1), 2010 ("Eine sechsmonatige, vorsorglich
anlasslose Speicherung von Telekommunikationsverkehrsdaten durch pri-
vate Diensteanbieter, wie sie die Richtlinie 2006/24/EG des Europaischen
Parlaments . .. vorsieht, ist mit Art. 10 GG nicht schlechthin unvereinbar.").
In May 2012, the European Commission responded to Germany's failure to
transpose the Data Retention Directive into national law by bringing suit at
the European Court of Justice and proposing that a daily penalty of over
C315,000 be imposed. Press Release, European Comm'n, Data Retention:
Commission Takes Germany to Court Requesting That Fines Be Imposed
(May 31, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-530-en.htm?lo
cale=en.
26. Bignami, supra note 17, at 821.
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edy to fragmentation among member states' differing privacy
regimes, it has not gone far enough; the Commission there-
fore recently proposed to replace the Directive with a new Reg-
ulation of the European Parliament,27 which would be directly
enforceable and which is meant to raise the costs of non-com-
pliance by the private sector and by member states.28
At the core of the European data protection framework's
power as an instrument of global administration, however, is
not its character as an informal network but rather its author-
ity to make extraterritorial rules. As Kingsbury et al. identify,
"distributed administration" is a core type of global administra-
tion, and it occurs when domestic agencies "take decisions on
issues of foreign or global concern. An example is in the exer-
cise of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, in which one
state seeks to regulate activity primarily occurring else-
where."2 9 While the European data protection regime should
not be understood as a purely "domestic" regime, its power to
regulate data transfers outside its own borders is a core attri-
bute of distributed domestic administration.
Thus Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, which
forbids the transfer of data to "third countries" without ade-
quate safeguarding mechanisms, purports to protect citizens'
data regardless of where it is housed.30 Arguably, Article 25 is
not an extension of regulatory authority beyond European
borders because it affects only European actors who want to
27. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation],
at 2, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/review20l2/com_2012_1len.pdf ("The
current framework remains sound as far as its objectives and principles are
concerned, but it has not prevented fragmentation in the way personal data
protection is implemented across the Union, legal uncertainty and a wide-
spread public perception that there are significant risks associated notably
with online activity.").
28. See id. at 2 (calling for a framework backed by "strong enforcement");
see also Impact Assessment Accompanying the General Data Protection Regulation, at
19, SEC (2012) 72 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/review20l2/sec_2012-72_en.pdf (find-
ing that unenforceability was a problem that had plagued the Data Protec-
tion Directive and made it difficult to secure compliance).
29. Kingsbury et al., supra note 14, at 21.
30. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 25.
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transfer data abroad.31 Under Article 25, no transfer of data
outside the European Union can be accomplished without ei-
ther a decision by the Commission that the receiving nation's
data protection regime is "adequate,"32 or that an ad hoc "safe
harbor" arrangement exists.33 However, the practice of finding
whether foreign data protection regimes effectively comply
with European law has forced third countries to adopt new
measures in order to comply.3 4 In measuring the "adequacy"
of a foreign data protection regime, the Commission shall take
into account "the rule of law,judicial redress and independent
supervision."3 5 In practice, this requirement is not at all easy to
meet; only five "third countries" have been recognized as hav-
ing adequate protections.36 Actors in other countries must ad-
equately contract for data protection, a process that is seen as
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id (anticipating in subsection 5 that "the Commission shall enter
into negotiations with a view to remedying the situation"); see also Model
Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EUROPEAN
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/interna-
tional-transfers/transfer/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (allowing
the Commission to determine that certain contractual clauses constitute "ad-
equate safeguards", even for data transfers to those countries that otherwise
would have insufficient safeguards), and Press Release, European Comm'n,
Data Protection: Commission Adopts Decisions Recognizing Adequacy of
Regimes in US, Switzerland and Hungary (July 27, 2000), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-00-865en.htm?locale=en ("Data transfers
to US organisations that choose to remain outside the 'safe harbor' will nor-
mally still be possible, but will either need to benefit from one of the allowed
exceptions (for example where the individuals concerned have given their
agreement), or will require alternative safeguards such as a contract.").
34. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact
of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of US. Privacy Standards, 25
YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 55 (2000) ("The EU Directive has drawn attention to data
privacy issues in the United States. It has pressed U.S. governmental authori-
ties to address the adequacy of current U.S. data privacy regulation . . . . It
has pressed U.S. businesses to enhance self-regulatory efforts to forestall EU
restrictions on data transfers to the United States, divert demands for stricter
U.S. regulation, and counter negative publicity . . . .").
35. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at 11.
36. Those countries are Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, and the U.K.
territories of the Isle of Man and Guernsey. Press Release, European
Comm'n, Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to
Third Countries - Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 7, 2005), available at eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/3&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN.
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messy and ad hoc.3 7 Indeed, the designation of "third coun-
tries" in the Data Protection Directive is somewhat archaic,
given the extensive responsibilities that private actors have for
safeguarding consumer data; it is not clear what, exactly, the
responsibility of the recipient country should be.3 8 In any case,
it has been argued that the adequacy determination is not a
"credible" determination of how data is actually processed, but
rather a judgment of the degree to which the data protection
scheme mirrors that of the European Union.39
Given the absence of formally binding international in-
struments in this area, the presence of soft law and overlap-
ping norms that shape the development of law is of particular
interest. Information privacy regulation in both the European
Union and United States stems from a set of "fair information
practice" principles, or FIPPs. 40 In the United States, these
principles originated in a 1973 Department of Housing, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) report that recommended the es-
tablishment of a "Code of Fair Information Practices" that pro-
tected individuals' rights to consent to use of their data, to ac-
cess and amend that data, and to know about the existence of
the records.41 Similarly, the 1980 OECD guidelines on privacy
urge member states to adopt legislation, promote self-regula-
37. See, e.g., Client Alert, Morrison & Foerster LLP, EU Data Protection
Requirements: An Overview for Employers (Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.mofo.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&
pub=7569 ("The rules are extensive and still evolving. They also differ signifi-
cantly from Member State to Member State.").
38. See ROBINSON ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN
DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 33 (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/technical_reports/2009/RANDTR71O.pdf ("[Interviewees] believed
that distinguishing between countries inside and outside the EU was unnec-
essary and counter-productive in the modem world. For multi-national or-
ganisations operating across boundaries but applying the same high stan-
dards of data protection across all geographical divisions, this mechanism
made no sense and was seen as contrary to harmonisation and global
trade.").
39. Id. at 33-34.
40. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 7 (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.
pdf (citing core principles of notice, consent, access, security, and redress as
common to American, European, and Canadian law).
41. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 29-30, 41-42, 50 (1973).
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tion, provide for enforcement of laws and oversight, and (per-
haps most importantly) provide for due process of data sub-
jects to access and control their own data.42 The OECD guide-
lines are notable in that, while non-binding, they broadly
enshrine principles of data protection that have been adopted
(or given lip service) across the board by member states as well
as corporations. 43 The FIPPs in the OECD guidelines also un-
dergird the Council of Europe Convention, the only binding
international instrument on data protection, which provides
for broad protections for citizens to access their own data-as
well as broad exceptions in the realms of "[s] tate security, pub-
lic safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppres-
sion of criminal offences." 44
In its privacy rankings of European nations, Privacy Inter-
national (PI) employs a number of metrics, including demo-
cratic safeguards, enforcement, constitutional and statutory
protections, visual surveillance, communications interception
and retention, and oversight of the agencies tasked with con-
ducting surveillance.45 While much is made in the data protec-
tion literature of the issue of oversight, the relative merits of
sectoral as opposed to comprehensive regulation, and the
42. OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980), available at http://www.oecd.org/in-
ternet/interneteconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtrans-
borderflowsofpersonaldata.htm. In 2011, the OECD adopted a recommen-
dation on Internet policymaking that recognized its own earlier privacy
guidelines and called for enhanced "multi-stakeholder co-operation in pol-
icy development processes" in order to keep the Internet open and free.
Because much of the debate over data protection centers on online activity,
these multi-stakeholder processes have become the linchpin of the data pro-
tection debate in the United States. See, e.g., John Verdi, The Privacy Multis-
takeholder Process Turns to Substance, NAT'L TELECOMMS & INFO. ADMIN. (Aug.
28, 2012), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2012/ privacy-multistakeholder-
process-turns-substance.
43. See, e.g., INTERNET ADVERTISING BuREAu, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), available at http://www.iab.
net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf (recognizing "consumer con-
trol," "education," and "transparency" as core principles of regulation of on-
line privacy).
44. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data art. 9, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. 108, available
at conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.
45. Privacy International, European Privacy and Human Rights 42-44,
available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.
org/files/file-downloads/ephr.pdf.
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presence or absence of a "right to privacy" in constitutions,
PI's criteria point to an important observation: data protection
issues do not exist in a vacuum, but are essentially related to
other features of the state and constitution that permit surveil-
lance, in varying degrees, by state and private entities.46
B. Privacy Law in Europe and America
While binding international regulation on data transfers
and data protection is vague, incomplete, and generally lack-
ing, European regulation is profuse. Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to privacy,
subject to limitation "in the interests of national security, pub-
lic safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."47 Litigation of the bounds of Article 8 has clarified
somewhat the scope of the right. In general, the Court has
engaged in a multi-step test in these inquiries: It first finds
whether there was an infringement on Article 8, in which case
it asks whether the surveillance was "authorized by law" and
whether it was necessary to defend democracy. 48
Thus, in Klass, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) held that a German law permitting surveillance of
post and telecommunications did not violate Article 8 because
the subject of surveillance was notified as soon as was possible
and because the safeguards in place would prevent the author-
ities from abusing their power.4 9 In Malone v. UK, in contrast,
the Court expanded on the notion of what it means for surveil-
46. Thus, in the European context, data protection law cannot be under-
stood without reference to norms governing privacy more generally, includ-
ing Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, known as the
ECHR, and individual national constitutions.
47. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S. no. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR], also
enshrines a right to privacy in Article 17, which is a derogable commitment.
48. Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 6, 1978),
43-44, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites /eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57510; Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 2,
1984), 62, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57533.
49. Klass, App. No. 5029/71, 11 58-59.
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lance to be "authorized," writing, "the law must be sufficiently
clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to
the circumstances in which and the conditions on which pub-
lic authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and po-
tentially dangerous interference" with Article 8 rights.5 0 In Ma-
lone, the U.K government suspected Malone of dealing in sto-
len goods, so (after obtaining a warrant) it placed a tap and a
pen register5' on his telephone. Finding that the relevant law
on the issuance of warrants was rife with "attendant obscurity
and uncertainty," the Court held that the surveillance was not
"in accordance with the law."5 2 Finally, in the paired cases of
Huvig v. France and Kruslin v. France, with facts similar to Ma-
lone, the Court held that France's law on wiretapping did not
adequately provide "clear, detailed rules," with the effect that
the law had inadequate safeguards against abuse.53 In so hold-
ing, the Court made clear that France had to set the safe-
guards out in law, rather than relying on its judicial culture to
prevent abuse.
Building on the ECtHR's privacy jurisprudence are the
several European Directives that directly address citizens'
rights to privacy in the data protection and electronic con-
texts. Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive, which en-
shrines the notion that under many circumstances a data sub-
ject must consent to the collection, processing, and use of his
or her data, and will later have access to that data, is among
the most important substantive guarantees. 54 In 2002, another
50. Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 1 67.
51. A pen register records the numbers dialed from a phone, but not the
conversations.
52. Malone, App. No. 8691/79, 11 79-80.
53. Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 24, 1990),
32, 34, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57627.
54. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 7. User consent is at the
core of the FIPPs, as well as the FTC "notice-and-choice" model that gave rise
to the proliferation of privacy policies. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRO-
TECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERs 2 (2012) ("The 'notice-and-choice
model,' which encouraged companies to develop privacy policies describing
their information collection and use practices, led to long, incomprehensi-
ble privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone under-
stand."). Choice is at the core of the "do not track" debate as well, which has
given rise to a debate about whether consumer choice is accurately reflected
in browser default settings communicating a preference not to be tracked.
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Directive directly addressed regulation for electronic commu-
nications providers, exempting the regulations for state secur-
ity that would be carried out by member states.55 More re-
cently, the European Union passed the Data Retention Direc-
tive, setting out rules for service providers to maintain data for
a given period of time, noting, "retention of data has proved to
be such a necessary and effective investigative tool for law en-
forcement in several Member States, and in particular con-
cerning serious matters such as organized crime and terror-
ism," that a comprehensive data retention law was deemed im-
mediately necessary.56
Most recently, proposed revisions to the European Union
framework include for the first time a Directive specifically
geared toward the use of personal data by government actors
in the context of law enforcement. Before the passage of the
Treaty of Lisbon, police and judiciary cooperation in criminal
law enforcement was a "third pillar" matter, to be regulated by
member states.57 Now that the former third pillar falls under
the rubric of the European Union, however, the Commission
has proposed a new Directive to define "rules relating to
processing of personal data for the purposes of prevention, in-
vestigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or
See id. at 35 ("Two trade organizations argued that the framework should
identify those practices for which choice is appropriate rather than making
choice the general rule .. . . The majority of commenters, however, did not
challenge the proposed framework's approach of setting consumer choice as
the default."); see also Letter from Randall Rothenberg, President and CEO,
Internet Advertising Bureau, to the Federal Trade Commission (May 31,
2012), available at https://www.iab.net/public-policy/InternetExplorer
("We do not believe that default settings that automatically make choices for
consumers increase transparency or consumer choice.").
55. Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection
of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37,
38 ("E-Privacy Directive").
56. Directive 2006/24, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connec-
tion with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Ser-
vices or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/
58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, 55 [hereinafter Data Retention Directive].
57. Pre-Lisbon, criminal matters were essentially beyond the ambit of Eu-
ropean Union law. See, e.g., Case C-176/03, Comm'n v. Council, 2005 E.C.R.
1-7907. ("[N]either criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall
within the Community's competence").
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the execution of criminal offences."58 The new Directive
would permit the transfer of data to third countries if "neces-
sary for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties,"
assuming compliance with safeguards set up in the Directive.59
It is worth noting that the requirements for safeguards in
the new proposed Directive are far less stringent than the ones
in the original Data Protection Directive, probably because the
Directive deals explicitly with the exceptional circumstances
surrounding law enforcement. In the Directive, for example, a
data subject may "object at any time on compelling legitimate
grounds . . . to the processing of data relating to him, save
where otherwise provided by national legislation."6 0 In the
Regulation, in contrast, the controller may override an objec-
tion if it "demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the
processing which override the interests or fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject."61 National legislation is
thus no longer required for data controllers to rebut objec-
tions to processing. In addition, the relationship of the pro-
posed new Directive to terrorism investigations is unclear, as
European counterterrorism strategy overlaps with, but is in
some ways distinct from, criminal law enforcement.62
American law on privacy differs sharply from European
law in several respects. The United States Constitution does
not enshrine a "right to privacy," although several provisions
have been read to supply that right.6 3 The Fourth Amend-
58. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent
Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of
Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of
Such Data, at 6, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:
PDF.
59. Id. at 41.
60. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 14.
61. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, art. 19.
62. SeeKim Lane Scheppele, Other People's PATRIOT Acts: Europe's Response
to September 11, 50 Loy. L. REv. 89, 94 (2004) ("With respect to terrorism
offenses, one might say that September 11 created pressure for harmoniza-
tion of domestic criminal law across the EU faster than previously thought
possible.").
63. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 484-85 (1965)
(holding that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments all im-
plicate a "right to privacy").
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ment's warrant requirement and protections against unreason-
able search and seizure are the most classic source of citizens'
privacy rights vis-A-vis the government. 64 In addition, the First
Amendment has been read to guarantee free and anonymous
speech, 65 and the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process guarantee has been considered a source of privacy
rights in the family, the body, and intimate relations.6 6 State
constitutional provisions largely mirror those of the federal
constitution, but ten states have enshrined explicit rights to
privacy in their constitutions. 67
Federal legislation protects privacy in an array of areas,
including financial,68 communications, 69 public records,70 and
health, educational, and consumer records.7 1 In recent years,
many states have also enacted data breach notification statutes
to compel companies to disclose breaches related to personal
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)) (stating that the Fourth Amend-
ment creates a right to privacy "no less important than any other right care-
fully and particularly reserved to the people").
65. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
("Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dis-
sent.").
66. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (characterizing the right to mar-
riage as a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights"); see also 381 U.S. at
500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the ban on contraception use
within marriage infringed the Due Process Clause); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a prohibition on sodomy as inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause).
67. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See PRIVACY PROTEC-
TIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
68. E.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2011); Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2011).
69. E.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1812 (2006); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2709 (2006).
70. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Drivers' Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2012).
71. E.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1232g (2011); Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (2012).
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data.72 The statutory differences between European and Amer-
ican law are perhaps the most discussed aspect of the diver-
gence between the two systems.73 The "sectoral" approach, it is
said, means that "protections frequently lag behind" those in
Europe,74 and was one of the reasons for developing the Safe
Harbor Agreement that permitted data transfers after the pas-
sage of the Data Protection Directive in 1995.75
U.S. jurisprudence on privacy is wide-ranging and com-
plex, and relates largely to intrusions by the government. In
1967, the seminal case of Katz v. United States held that a war-
rant was required to wiretap a public phone, reversing decades
of decisions finding that whether an intrusion was a "search"
protected by the Fourth Amendment depended on whether it
intruded on a constitutionally protected area.76 Katz, in con-
trast, held that privacy was the "right to be let alone"-regard-
less of where one found oneself.77 Justice Harlan's concur-
rence in Katz established the two-part test for defining the
scope of Fourth Amendment searches-"first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 7 8
Since Katz, however, a large loophole has been carved out
for searches of information shared with third parties. In 1976,
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Miller that citizens
72. State Security Breach Notification Laws, National Conference of State
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecommunications-in-
formation-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (last visited Feb.
15, 2013).
73. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 34, at 26 ("While U.S. data privacy protec-
tion may be adequate under EU standards in some sectors, it was thought
inadequate in most."); see also PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN PRIvACY
AND HumAN RIGHTs 42 (2010), available at https://www.privacyinternational.
org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/ephr.pdf (writing
that sectoral legislation is "additional" to comprehensive legislation).
74. Banisar and Davies, supra note 18, at 14.
75. See Shaffer, supra note 34, at 59 ("In an effort to demonstrate to the
European Union that privacy protection can be assured through business
self-regulation and, in the process, shield U.S. businesses engaged in self-
regulation from data transfer restrictions, Commerce issued a draft of 'Safe
Harbor Principles' in November 1998 . . . .").
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.").
77. Id. at 350.
78. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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had no expectation of privacy in the data they share with their
banks.79 Likewise, the Court extended the carve out in 1979 to
include transactional records kept by phone companies.80 This
lacuna has come to be known as the "third-party doctrine,"
which essentially defines information shared with a third party
as beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.81 This degree
of government access to personal information is far beyond
the scope of anything imagined under European jurispru-
dence on Article 8.
Technological innovation further complicates the picture
of third-party doctrine by rapidly eroding the distinction be-
tween content and non-content information. As transactions
increasingly take place on the Internet, internet service provid-
ers host a huge amount of personal information, both transac-
tional and content related. The Electronic Communications
Protection Act distinguishes between records that include
"content" from those that do not, requiring that government
authorities obtain a warrant before getting content informa-
tion. What records are "content" and what are not is unclear.
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that citizens
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
their email.82 However, Orin Kerr points out that it is some-
times very difficult to distinguish content from "envelope" in-
formation-not only conceptually, but also logistically.83
79. 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976).
80. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-42, 745-47 (1979).
81. See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IowA L.
REv. 581, 596-601 (2011) (summarizing the development of a third party
doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence), and Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561, 566-70 (2009) (summarizing the develop-
ment of the third-party doctrine); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. -
(2012) (Sotomayor,J., concurring) ("[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties." (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 742 (1976) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))).
82. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a subscriber of a commercial Internet service provider enjoyed a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his emails, but leaving open the question
whether contractual terms may sometimes suffice to eliminate that expecta-
tion).
83. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act:
The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 613-15 (2003) (explaining
that in some cases content and envelope may be bundled and transmitted in
a single, indivisible "packet" of information). Additionally, the inclusion of
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C. Understanding the Divergence
An all-encompassing definition of privacy is hard to find;
Daniel Solove suggests that even within the United States' le-
gal tradition, the notion of "privacy" is incoherent, arguing,
"[i]t is no accident that various problems are referred to as
privacy violations; they bear substantial similarities to each
other. But we also must recognize where they diverge."84
Scholars and policymakers often deem the European ap-
proach, which treats privacy as a "fundamental right," to be at
odds with the American approach, which frequently balances
between competing interests. At least two accounts of this di-
vergence emerge in the literature. Either the two traditions
have evolved very different conceptions of privacy, which their
respective laws reflect, or one approach simply protects privacy
"more" than the other.
In James Whitman's account of the divergence, European
law protects a dignitarian conception of privacy, while Ameri-
can law is focused more on protecting privacy as it pertains to
liberty. "When continental lawyers speak of 'privacy' as a set of
rights over the control of one's image, name, and reputation,
and over the public disclosure of information about oneself,
they are speaking to these selfsame continental sensibilities."8 5
In contrast, Francesca Bignami argues that divergences in
"content" information in the "envelope" would conceivably render that in-
formation no longer subject to the Fourth Amendment under third-party
doctrine, even though the user did not know or intend the content of his
email to be shared. And certain types of activity do not lend themselves to
the "content/envelope distinction." See, e.g., Matthew D. Lawless, The Third
Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case for a "Crazy Quilt" of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J. L. & TECH., 2007, no. 2, 2007, at 1,
18 ("Internet search records bear no characteristics that would make them
wholly analogous to either content or envelope information ex ante."); see
generally Ian James Samuel, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1324, 1332 (2008) (arguing that location tracking information does not
readily fit within the content/envelope distinction).
84. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 486
(2006).
85. James Q.Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Piracy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1167 (2004); see also EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY
AND LIBERW CONSTITUTIONAL VisioNs IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
62 (2002) (explaining the German conception of constitutional "personality
rights" as an outgrowth of human dignity and "Kant's theory of moral auton-
omy").
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counterterrorism policy disclose merely that "liberty is pro-
tected more in Europe than in the United States."8 6 Bignami
attributes divergence in regulation of the public sector to gaps
in enforcement and executive power, and to Europe's "partic-
ularly vivid understanding of the possible abuses of state
power."87
Understanding the extent of the normative divergence
between Europe and the United States is crucial to assessing
the success of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program as an
instrument of global administrative law. Given the two statu-
tory schemes' common sources in FIPPs, the differences do
not seem to be deeply ideological, but rather more profoundly
rooted in choices about implementation. Where the United
States has embraced industry self-regulation, and legislation
only in the event of serious breaches, the European Union has
engineered a more holistic approach that seeks to anticipate
privacy-invading technological developments before they hap-
pen.
II. THE TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING PROGRAM
A. Characterizing the TFTP
In 2006, Eric Lichtblau and James Risen-the same jour-
nalists who broke the story of the National Security Agency's
warrantless wiretapping operations-informed readers of the
New York Times that the Central Intelligence Agency and Trea-
sury Department had accessed "tens of thousands" of financial
records from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Transactions (SWIFT) using administrative subpoenas.8 8 The
novel part of the arrangement was in its scope: Rather than
using warrants or subpoenas to access individual transactions,
or transactions related to a particular suspect, the Terrorist Fi-
nance Tracking Program sifted through millions of records
contained in a database.89 Indeed, in testimony before a
House subcommittee after the New York Times article had
run, Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey maintained that be-
cause of the restrictions on use of the database, the Treasury
86. Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Pri-
vacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 612 (2007).
87. Id. at 688.
88. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 1.
89. Id.
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Department had accessed "only a minute fraction of the data
that SWIFT has provided."90
Although most of the reports on the TFTP did not make
clear the exact contours of the database to which the United
States gained access, a few aspects are evident. First, the SWIFT
database encompassed the data of many European and Ameri-
can citizens. 91 Second, the United States did not gain access to
all of SWIFT's data-although it is not clear to what extent the
cooperative would have access to routine American financial
transactions in the first place, the subset of data which the gov-
ernment could access certainly did not include information on
American ATM transactions, etc. 9 2 Third, in order to process
the vast quantities of information to which the Department
had suddenly gained access, it needed to use sophisticated
technological tools.9 3
In response to the disclosures, the data protection author-
ities of the European Union and of the member states initi-
ated investigations and protests. The Article 29 Data Protec-
tion Working Party, an independent European Commission
advisory body, issued an opinion stating that the mere
"processing and mirroring" of data in SWIFT's United States
servers violated the Data Protection Directive, not to mention
the transfer of that data to the Treasury. 94 "The lack of trans-
90. Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Finan-
cial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Before the House Finan-
cial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Cong.
(2006), available at http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/
071106sl.pdf.
91. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 1 ("One person involved in the Swift
program estimated that analysts had reviewed international transfers involv-
ing 'many thousands' of people or groups in the United States.").
92. See Testimony of Stuart Levey, supra note 90, at 30 (claiming that no
ATM transactions were included in the data set transmitted by SWIFT).
93. See, e.g., Ekrem Duman & Ayse Buyukkaya, Money Laundering Detection
Using Data Mining, in MINING MASSIVE DATA SETS FOR SECURITY 287 (F. Fogel-
man-Solid et al. eds., 2008) (identifying problems with using "rule-based"
detection techniques to implement anti-money laundering systems and sug-
gesting a two-phase anti-money laundering system that uses data mining
instead).
94. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 10/2006
ON THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA BY THE SOCIETY FOR WORLDWIDE IN-
TERBANK FINANCIAL TELECOMMUNICATION (SWIFT) 21 (2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wpl28-
en.pdf.
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parency and adequate and effective control mechanisms that
surrounds the whole process .. . represents a serious breach"
of the Data Protection Directive, the Working Party con-
cluded. 95 The Belgian Data Protection Authority issued a pre-
liminary opinion on the issue concluding that SWIFT's failure
to notify its customers and its decision to transfer data to the
United States violated the Data Protection Directive, although
it acknowledged that SWIFT was in a conflict of laws situation
with regard to the dueling objectives of European data privacy
law and the American subpoenas.96
In response, the European Union and the United States
negotiated a stopgap solution by which SWIFT would join the
Safe Harbor agreement, making the certifications necessary
for it to be able to transfer personal data to the United
States.9 7 In addition, the Treasury made unilateral representa-
tions to the Commission describing the "rigorous controls and
safeguards" in the program.9 8 Negotiations continued for a
more comprehensive solution. In November 2009 the Euro-
pean Commission and the United States reached a draft short-
term agreement on bank data transfers, 99 which the European
Parliament voted down in February 2010.100
95. Id. at 26.
96. Commission de la Protection de la Vie Priv6e [Belgian Data Protec-
tion Authority], Avis relatif d la transmission de donndes d caract&re personnel par
la SCRL SWIFT suite aux sommations de l'UST [Opinion on the Transfer of Per-
sonal Data by the CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAG) Subpoenas], SA2 / A /
2006 / 035, at 21 (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2006/sep/swift-belgium-opinion-fr.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
97. See SWIFT Safe Harbor Policy, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/about
swift/legal/compliance/data-protection-policies/swift safe-harbor-policy.
page (last updated July 17, 2012) (describing the Safe Harbor program); see
also Organization Information, http://safeharbor.export.gov/companyinfo.
aspx?id=15776 (showing that SWIFT was certified in July 2007) (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013).
98. Letter from United States Department of the Treasury regarding
SWIFT/Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (EU) No. 09/2007 of 20 July
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 166) 7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:166:0017:0017:EN:PDF.
99. Agreement, supra note 3.
100. Press Release, European Parliament, SWIFT: European Parliament
Votes Down Agreement with the US (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20
1002091PR68674+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN.
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In July 2010, the European Parliament passed a new bank
transfers deal, which took effect the following month.101 The
new agreement purportedly addressed the Parliament's con-
cerns with the earlier version, which did not adequately ad-
dress the substantive issues associated with data protection and
did not provide an adequate "redress mechanism."102 In re-
sponse to these concerns, the TFTP agreement as imple-
mented installs Europol, the European law enforcement
agency, as an intermediary body to "verify" United States re-
quests to European Union-based holders of bank data, and im-
poses a number of conditions on the United States Treasury
when making its requests, including specifying necessity, clear
identification of the data, and narrow tailoring of the re-
quests.103 The next section of this Note addresses whether the
new TFTP agreement embodies rules that can be considered
as adequate as a mechanism of global administrative law.
B. The TFTP as a Mechanism of Global Administrative Law
Nominally, at least, the European backlash against TFTP
was prompted by the lack of procedural protections in the pro-
gram. In the aftermath of the press's disclosures, European
data privacy activists decried the lack of oversight, 1 0 4 notice,105
opportunity to challenge the collection,106 and the very nature
of the subpoenas.1 07 Strictly speaking, the TFTP might be
viewed as a more classic example of international lawmaking-
a bilateral agreement between two nations geared toward solv-
ing a specific problem. 08 Yet the program's role as a method
of extending intergovernmental standards on safeguarding
privacy to a national regime makes it more complex. The
101. Agreement, supra note 3.
102. Press Release, supra note 100.
103. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.
104. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 94, at
19-20 (discussing the implications of failure to notify European data protec-
tion authorities).
105. Id. (failure to notify data subjects).
106. Id. at 11 ("SWIFT decided to comply with the US subpoenas.").
107. Id. at 8 ("The scope of the UST subpoenas in this case is materially,
territorially and in time very wide . . . .").
108. Kingsbury et al., supra note 14, at 25 ("[I]n some areas of regulatory
administration, such as international security, the classical view that global
governance is directed at the behavior of governments toward other govern-
ments, rather than toward private actors, still has great force.").
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TFIP exists at the overlap of several distinct subject areas
within the global administrative space and embodies some of
the distinct characteristics of mechanisms operating within
that space. Particularly, as Kingsbury et al. point out, the TFTP
is an example of a scenario in which "the decisions of domestic
administrators are increasingly constrained by substantive and
procedural norms established at the global level; the formal
need for domestic implementation thus no longer provides for
meaningful independence of the domestic from the inter-
national realm."109
The roots of the TFTP exemplify the classic traits evident
in global administrative law mechanisms more generally. The
TFTP is oriented toward restraining not only government ac-
tors, but also private actors who, by their very nature, engage
in data collection and analysis.110 Its implementation of Euro-
pol as the reviewing body superimposes another level of review
onto the respective administrative review mechanisms extant
in European and American law. At the same time, however,
the TFIP remains riddled with gaps that make its value as a
GAL mechanism highly questionable. Specifically, as ad-
dressed below, while the Agreement is meant to realize com-
mon procedural and substantive norms of privacy protection,
it fails to do so. More seriously, by failing to implement mean-
ingful redress or provide for "reasoned decisionmaking" on
the part of Europol, the TFIP agreement achieves neither
meaningful legality, reasoned decisionmaking, nor effective
review.'11
In assessing the TFTP's success, or lack thereof, as an in-
strument of Global Administrative Law, traditional concep-
tions of the distinction between substance and procedure do
not always play out as expected with regard to legal protections
for privacy. As a GAL mechanism, the TFT'P is best understood
as offering both substantive and procedural privacy protec-
tions. As I demonstrate, these protections overlap significantly,
both in the guarantees offered by the TFTP itself as well as in
the European privacy laws with which it must comply. Articles
109. Id. at 26.
110. See Commission de la Protection de la Vie Priv6e, supra note 96, at
20-21 (chastising SWIFT for complying with U.S. subpoenas and for main-
taining servers in the United States more generally).
111. Kingsbury et al., supra note 14, at 28.
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6, 7, 25, and 26 of the Data Protection Directive, which articu-
late, respectively, the conditions for the principles of data
quality and proportionality, legitimacy of processing, prnci-
ples for data transfers to a third country, and conditions for
derogations from those principles, create a hodgepodge of
substantive and procedural protections for personal data.112 In
contrast, Articles 10, 11, 18, 19, and 20 offer concrete procedu-
ral requirements with which data controllers must comply.113
Article 6 of the Directive requires that personal data be
accurate, processed "fairly and lawfully" and for "specified, ex-
plicit and legitimate purposes," and that it not be retained for
longer than necessary.'1 4 It also imposes a requirement that
processing be proportional to the initial purpose for which
data was collected.11 5 Article 7 articulates the conditions under
which data processing is "legitimate": unambiguous consent of
the subject, or that it is necessary for fulfillment of a contract,
compliance with a legal obligation, protection of the "vital
interests" of the subject, "performance of a task carried out in
the public interest," or the legitimate interests of the data
controller."i6
These conditions substantially mix the procedural and
substantive interests at stake. Indeed, perhaps the biggest dis-
tinction between the Fair Information Practices that undergird
U.S. and EU privacy law and the provisions of European law
itself is the specification of procedures to protect privacy. The
requirement that data be processed "lawfully" and for "speci-
fied, explicit and legitimate purposes" implies that national
law provides the procedures by which a company can comply.
And, indeed, member states' data protection laws require that
data processors inform consumers of the use and purpose of
their data processing." 7 But the proportionality requirement
112. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, arts. 6, 7, 25, 26.
113. Id. arts. 10, 11 (setting out the scope of information to be given to the
data subject); arts. 18-21 (setting out the obligation to notify the Member
State's supervisory authority, the scope of notification requirement, and the
obligation of supervisory authority to conduct checks and to publicize opera-
tions).
114. Id. art. 6(1).
115. Id. art. 6(1)(c) ("adequate, relevant and not excessive").
116. Id. art. 7.
117. See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection
Act], Sept. 1, 2009, BGBL. 2009 I at 2814, § 4(2) (Ge.); Loi relative A la pro-
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in Article 6 is not always met with substantive definitions in
national law. In the Belgian privacy law, in fact, the Directive's
requirements are simply reiterated, not elaborated upon,
whereas in the German privacy law they are not even re-
peated. 118 Thus, while some of the Directives' requirements
clearly embody procedural requirements to satisfy substantive
norms of notice and limitation on data use, others raise more
questions than they answer.
In the TFTP case, the German chancellor interpreted
German data protection law to be amenable to data sharing of
the kind Treasury sought. 119 German members of European
Parliament (MEPs), however, led the charge against the TFTP
in the European Parliament, angering Angela Merkel and
jeopardizing the transatlantic relationship. 1 2 0 In fact, one of
the MEPs' reactions to the ultimate TFTP deal was to call for
an international binding agreement on the content of the def-
inition of privacy-a notion that, given the amount of strife
both transatlantically and within Europe on this issue, seems
laughable.
Europol's Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) reviewed Europol
activities in November 2010 for compliance with these proce-
dures. While many of their findings remain classified,121 the
conclusion is stunning. The JSB found that Treasury's requests
were "almost identical in nature," so "abstract" and "broad" as
to render it "impossible" to assess whether they were in compli-
ance with the terms of the agreement. Moreover, JSB noted,
"[i]nformation provided orally-to certain Europol staff by
tection des donn6es ; caractare personnel [Privacy Protection in Relation to
the Processing of Personal Data] of Dec. 8, 1992, Moniteur Belge [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Feb. 3, 1999, 3049, art. 9.
118. Id. art. 4, § 1.
119. See Cable from American Embassy Berlin to Depts. Of Treasury,
Homeland Security, Justice et al., Chancellor Merkel Angered by Lack of
German MEP Support for TFTP (Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://
wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/1OBERLIN18O.html (indicating that Merkel
had "personally lobbied" German MEPs to support the agreement and that
they voted against it anyway).
120. Id.
121. EUROPOL JOIr SUPERVISORY BODY, REPORT No. JSB/INs. 11-07, RE-
PORT ON THE INSPECTION OF EUROPOL'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TFTP AGREE-
MENT 5 (2011), available at http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/media/
111009/terrorist%20finance%20tracking%20program%20(tftp)%20inspec
tion%20report%20-%20public%20version.pdf.
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the US Treasury Department, with the stipulation that no writ-
ten notes are made-has had an impact upon each of Euro-
pol's decisions; however, the JSB does not know the content of
that information."
As a matter of global administrative law, JSB's findings in-
dicate a severe accountability deficit. Accountability mecha-
nisms are meant to share four features:
(1) a specified accountor, who is subject to being
called to provide account including, as appropriate,
explanation and justification for some specified as-
pect or range of his conduct; (2) a specified account
holder or accountee; (3) authority on the part of the
accountee to demand that the accountor render ac-
count for his performance; and (4) the ability and
authority of the account holder to impose sanctions
or secure other remedies for performance that he
judges to be deficient or, in some cases, to confer re-
wards for superior performance.122
In this case, while the first three features are present, the
"account holder"-JSB-has no practical ability to impose
sanctions on the Treasury for failing to comply. Moreover,
JSB's report suggests not only that the Treasury may not be
complying with the terms of the agreement, but also that the
very nature of the manner in which the requests are made renders it
impossible for the supervising body to do its job. From the perspec-
tive of global administration, the failure of procedures at this
level is even more troubling than the potential disregard for
substantive norms, as it implies that transparency and free ac-
cess to information are also being disregarded. Because Euro-
pol (and, by extension, the JSB) is the primary source of ac-
countability for EU citizens whose data are being requested,
the suggestion that the very architecture of the agreement
makes accountability and oversight impossible leaves open the
question of whether the program can be accountable at all to a
European citizen.
Equally troubling is the lack of a concrete redress mecha-
nism, a problem at the heart of the European Parliament's ini-
tial rejection of the program. The agreement sets out rights of
122. Richard Stewart, Accountability, Participation, and the Problem of
Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance 15 (Jan. 2008) (draft) (on file
with author).
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access and rectification for European citizens to verify that
their information has been collected in compliance with the
terms of the agreement.123 In turn, the Treasury Department
has published its "redress procedures," which essentially re-
quire that those whose requests are denied sue the Depart-
ment under the Administrative Procedures Act and/or the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 124 If this requirement
was merely onerous for European citizens, it would probably
still be a permissible way of achieving judicial oversight of the
program. But the nature of the Acts that the Redress Proce-
dures cite is such that almost every request will be turned
down under FOIA's national security exemption. 125
Moreover, it is practically inexplicable that the agreement
completely removes any redress mechanism within Europe it-
self. Not only does this place an extremely high burden on
European citizens to familiarize themselves with American ad-
ministrative law and to bear the high costs of litigating these
(ultimately fruitless) suits, it also insulates the private actors
whom it seeks to regulate from liability in their home jurisdic-
tions by placing them completely outside of the scope of the
Directive and providing an American remedy in its stead. Fail-
ing to provide a European remedy, in other words, intention-
ally overlooks the significance of European law on data protec-
tion in terms of negotiating the TFTP at the outset.
These characteristics of the TFTP-lack of redress, lack of
accountability, and lack of oversight-should put to rest any
illusions that European opposition to the program was based
on principled objections to privacy-ivasive activity. It is indeed
difficult to see why, if European procedural protections are so
strong, at least slightly more responsive mechanisms were not
built into the program. I turn now to a final odd requirement
within the TFTP agreement, Article 5's "safeguard" that "the
TFTP does not and shall not involve data mining or any other
123. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 15.
124. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING PROGRAM: REDRESS
PROCEDURES FOR SEEKING ACCESS, RECTIFICATION, ERASURE, OR BLOCKING
(2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Terrorist-Finance-Tracking/Documents/Revised%20Redress%20
Procedures%20for%2OWeb%20Posting%20 (8-8-11).pdf.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (2000). Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973) (stating that the national security exemption prevents plaintiffs from
obtaining any properly classified records).
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type of algorithmic or automated profiling or computer filter-
ing."12 6 As I discuss in the next Part, it is precisely the exis-
tence of algorithmic filtering capabilities that makes bulk data
transfers like those in the TFTP useful. This prohibition thus
raises unanswerable questions about the content of the TFTP
in a technological sense. More importantly, as I conclude, it
presages important developments in the use of bulk data trans-
fers that may not yet be ripe for international regulation.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING
PROGRAM FOR "DATAVEILLANCE"
Although the TFTP is in large part conceived as an agree-
ment to facilitate cooperation in the law enforcement and
counterterrorism realm, it has much to say as well about the
nature of evolving technology. Restrictions on bulk transfers,
data processing, aggregation, and analysis techniques speak
both to traditional concerns about limiting government's abil-
ity to surveil citizens and to novel concerns about the evolving
capabilities of technology in conducting surveillance. And the
TFTP is best understood in light of the fact that while formal
and informal agreements on mutual legal assistance and coop-
eration among intelligence agencies are rich and plentiful,
neither normative nor procedural limitations on the uses of
technology are forthcoming. Independently operating agree-
ments like the TFTP, thus, are prime examples of how global
administration is stepping in to fill the gaps in a less-than-com-
prehensive manner.
The landscape of international technology governance is
surprisingly bleak. Technological innovation is governed in
large part by recourse to the international intellectual prop-
erty regime, exemplified by the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).*127 The In-
ternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) controls the allocation of domain names, internet
protocol (IP) addresses, and port and parameter numbers,128
126. Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.
127. Katherine Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global In-
tellectual Propery Regime, 41 CONN. L. REv. 861, 862-66 (2009).
128. About Us, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012).
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which is something like entrusting a nonprofit corporation to
allocate street addresses, zip codes, and telephone numbers
for the entire globe. With regard to internet governance in
particular, some have raised the issue that developing nations
have only an "advisory" role in influencing policy; despite see-
ing the internet as a global "public good," the U.S. govern-
ment (through ICANN) has a monopoly on regulating it.129
Others have noted that since TRIPS was concluded in 1994,
and ICANN was chartered in 1998, technology has changed
drastically-not just in terms of its capabilities, but also by
shifting from a market-based model toward one of "user inno-
vation and . .. open and collaborative innovative activity." 30
This shift is telling not only with regard to internet gov-
ernance (where much user innovation takes place) but also as
shifts in communication and information technology more
generally have far outpaced the expectations of the global
technology governance regime writ large. As Strandburg puts
it, a result of evolutions in communication technology is that
"the open and collaborative innovation paradigm is able not
only to find, make use of, and respond to heterogeneous and
localized preferences and experience but also to operate via a
global networked organizational structure which is not de-
fined by geographical or political boundaries."' 3 ' Yet just as
the United States informally exercises control over the devel-
opment of the Internet through ICANN, the European Union
is drastically shaping the norms surrounding data privacy well
beyond Europe's borders. As Gregory Shaffer points out,
through the Article 25 constraints on data transfers, "Euro-
pean regulation casts a net wider than Europe. In a globalizing
economy, European law also constrains U.S. domestic privacy
policies and practices."' 32 In the case of the TFTP, European
data privacy legislation exhibited a clear preference against
large-scale data-mining.
129. Surya Mani Tripathi et al., Internet Governance: A Developing Nation's
Call for Administrative Legal Reform, 37 Ir'L J. LEGAL INFO. 368, 382 (2009).
130. Strandburg, supra note 127, 871.
131. Id. at 884.
132. Shaffer, supra note 34, at 4.
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The TFTP is a compelling example of a new form of sur-
veillance, the contours of which are still being defined.13 3
Three characteristics set "dataveillance" apart from its prede-
cessor intelligence gathering and analysis techniques. First,
dataveillance is general, not individuated; surveillance takes
place inside a large dataset, not by looking for information on
individual suspects. Second, dataveillance relies heavily on in-
formation collected or aggregated by private actors, reducing
the costs imposed on the government to compile that informa-
tion itself. Finally, dataveillance is conducted by using forms of
analysis developed in large part by private actors.13 4
SWIFT is essentially a network or platform for financial
institutions to communicate with each other securely. Its
"core" service is the FIN messaging platform, which facilitates
communication of financial transactions between banks and
other institutions.13 5 SWIFT provides an "end-to-end view on
payment transactions and enquiries which eliminates the
'black hole' issue" for banks and their customers. 136 The net-
work also permits the transfer of batched transaction informa-
tion through its filesharing service, FileAct.13 7 SWIFT pub-
lishes information on its traffic monthly, making clear that it
provides support to thousands of financial institutions in more
than 200 countries, and transmitting millions of FIN and
FileAct messages daily.138 It is easy to see the value of these
messages in terms of financial intelligence: The same "end to
end view" that benefits banking customers whose transactions
get lost in the ether is the one that makes clear to the Treasury
Department the pathways of terrorist finance.
The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program is just one of
many financial surveillance tools in the Treasury Department's
133. Martin Kuhn dubs this form of surveillance "dataveillance," a moni-
ker I adopt as well. MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS (2007).
134. Id. at 4.
135. FIN Overview, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/products/fin (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2013).
136. Reaching Your Counterparties, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/solu-
tions/banks/reaching-yourcounterparties.page (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
137. File Act: Overview, SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/products/fileact
(last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
138. See SWIFT IN FIGURES, JANUARY 2011, http://www.swift.com/about
swift/company-information/swift-injfigures (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
626 [Vol. 45:595
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
arsenal. Indeed, in the oversight hearing that took place after
the program's disclosure, several members of Congress raised
the issue that much of terrorist finance took place through the
hawala system rather than through Western-style banking.139
Shane Harris reports that a separate team within Treasury,
called Operation Green Quest, was responsible for surveil-
lance of hawala transactions, going so far as to build dummy
websites in order to trap users who might be donating to ter-
rorist causes.140
But the TFTP differs tremendously from earlier programs,
not only in the scope of the data it includes, but also in the
methods by which that data is parsed and followed up to de-
velop investigations. As the following analysis should show,
both public and private actors maintain a veritable arsenal of
tools by which to analyze vast quantities of data, but the meth-
ods by which that analysis is accomplished are subject to very
different rules in the United States than in Europe. I turn now
to technological developments that are changing the land-
scape of data usage and analysis.
A. The Power of Data
. The study of the potential of very large data sets to dis-
close predictive patterns is at the heart of what is known as
computational social science, an emerging field that supplies
new technologies for exploring vast quantities of data. Private
industry has developed numerous algorithms to find patterns
and relationships among thousands or even millions of trans-
actions. For example, Google data on the volume of queries
associated with particular industries is correlated with eco-
nomic activity in those industries, to the extent that the trends
"predict the present."4 1 Private industry accumulates and im-
plements user data in a number of ways. Targeted advertising
is perhaps the best-known example for consumers. In the
United States, online tracking-the collection and usage of
139. The Terror Finance Tracking Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong.
28 (2006) (statement of Rep. Paul, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Ser-
vices).
140. SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S SURVEILLANCE
STATE 206-07 (2010).
141. Hyunyoung Choi & Hal Varian, Predicting the Present with Google
Trends, 88 EcoN. REc. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2, 2 (2012).
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large quantities of information about one's web browsing his-
tory-is governed only by industry self-regulation, not by stat-
ute. 142 This has resulted in an "opt-out" structure for con-
sumer consent to data gathering,14 3 and consequently the
proliferation of open-source software and other alternatives to
limit consumers' exposure.144 In contrast, the European E-Pri-
vacy Directive requires consumers to consent ex ante to usage
of their data for "value added services."I 45 An economic analy-
sis of behavioral advertising regimes discloses that the reasons
for adopting an opt-in as opposed to opt-out rule is not eco-
nomic as much as it is related to the "value" of personal pri-
vacy and the somewhat intangible "costs" incurred when third
parties breach that right.14 6
142. Byron Acohido, More Web Surfers Tell Trackers To Keep Out, USA TODAY,
Dec. 30, 2011, at B1 ("The FTC called for a Do Not Track mechanism that
would enable Internet users to request not to be tracked .... But tracking
and online advertising companies lobbied intensively to maintain industry
self-policing as the status quo."); see also AM. Ass'N OF ADVER. AGENCIES ET AL.,
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 1, 15-16
(2009), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.
pdf (exemplifying a self-regulatory approach to online tracking).
143. See Andrea N. Person, Behavioral Advertisement Regulation: How the Neg-
ative Perception of Deep Packet Inspection Technology May Be Limiting the Online
Experience, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 435, 448-49 (2010) (noting that, though not
required by law to do so, some companies have responded to congressional
and media pressure by moving to more transparent, opt-in consent struc-
tures).
144. See, e.g., GHOSTERY, https://www.ghostery.com (last visited Feb. 19,
2013); AD-BLOCK PLUS, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/
adblock-plus/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013); TRACKERBLOCK, https://ad-
dons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/trackerblock/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2013); Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Do Not Track: Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. 16
(2010) (statement of David Vladeck, Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/101202
donottrack.pdf ("[T]he Commission supports a more uniform and compre-
hensive consumer choice mechanism for online behavioral advertising,
sometimes referred to as 'Do Not Track.'").
145. Directive 2009/136, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 Nov. 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and
Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Ser-
vices, art. 6(3), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 30-31 (EC).
146. Michael R. Hammock & Paul H. Rubin, Applications Want To Be Free:
Privacy Against Information, 7 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 41, 46-47 (2011) (ar-
guing that privacy advocates do not consider the "efficiency" of the default
rule by not conducting a quantitative cost-benefit analysis).
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The proliferation of information about users is a conse-
quence of the proliferation of modern technology. Verizon
Wireless has 94 million wireless subscribers;147 AT&T has more
than 100 million.14 8 Data is routinely recorded on each sub-
scriber, conveying information not just on usage of text mes-
saging and data plans but also on location, movement, and
patterns of communication. 149 Similarly, data on such dispa-
rate occurrences as credit card transactions, online searches,
electricity usage, mammograms, and traffic jams is collected
and stored by commercial providers. 150 This data provides a
wealth of information on public health issues, social relations,
and economic and geographic trends, which social scientists
have embraced, finding new methods of mining and analyzing
sources for new patterns of human behavior.
Not surprisingly, one of the first areas to use large
amounts of privately available data was public health. In 2008,
Google started its Predict and Prevent Initiative, a global
health initiative designed to integrate information on live-
stock, human, wildlife, and agricultural disease issues, and to
embrace digital detection technologies. 15 1 In 2009, a group of
Google software engineers, statisticians, and social scientists
published a paper on Google Flu Trends, a Google initiative
that matched online search query patterns with the actual oc-
currence of influenza. The authors noted, "[b]ecause search
147. Verizon Communications Fact Sheet, VERIZON, http://216.70.96.173/
themes/sitethemes/agilerecords/images/uploads/2Q1 2_VZFactSheet.
pdf.
148. AT&T Reports Solid Earnings, Strong Cash Flow, Robust Mobile Broadband
Sales and Improving Wireline Revenue Trends, AT&T (Oct. 20, 2011), http://
www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=21794&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=33126
&mapcode=financial.
149. See, e.g., AT&T Privacy Policy, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/pri-
vacy-policy?pid=2506 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (indicating that the service
collects and uses account information, usage information, and location in-
formation, and shares some of it, in some forms, with third parties).
150. See generally Jan Beyea, The Smart Electricity Grid and Scientific Research,
328 Sci. 979, 979-80 (2010) (discussing the increased access to customer
data that is soon to be possible through the application of new technologies
to electricity grids in the United States); Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last updatedJuly 27, 2012) (dis-
cussing the collection and storage of credit card transactions, search queries,
and more).
151. Predict and Prevent, GOOGLE.ORG (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.google.
org/Predict Prevent Brief.pdf .
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queries can be processed quickly, the resulting ILI [influenza-
like illness] estimates were consistently 1-2 weeks ahead of
CDC ILI surveillance reports."15 2 One of the authors of the
paper, Larry Brilliant, later served as the chair of the National
Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, which endorsed (in
vague terms) the use of "digital innovations" to speed detec-
tion and information, while acknowledging potential road-
blocks in the form of rules about data sharing and intellectual
property.153 Google has since expanded its predictive search
efforts in this area to dengue fever, using Dengue Trends to
track outbreaks in the countries most affected by the illness.'54
"Smart" technologies also offer potential troves of data
that can solve many public health conundrums. "[T] he small,
cheap electronic technologies embedded into medical devices,
pharmaceuticals, and environmental sensors" can be used to
track asthma and respiratory illness outbreaks in the Middle
East and Asia, areas currently underserved by biosurveillance
technologies.' 55 Likewise, Jan Beyea argues that the many
petabytes of data created by "smart meters," which transmit in-
formation on electricity usage to utility companies, have impli-
cations for epidemiological studies related to obesity, air pollu-
tion, and electromagnetic fields. 15 6 This latter example also
has broad economic significance, as Beyea points out, in that
electricity usage can be examined in connection with price,
household income, and household size.
Similarly, Google has shown that for certain industries,
such as automotive sales, online search query trends are posi-
tively associated with contemporaneous economic activity.15 7
Likewise, Jure Leskovec analyzed a set of 90 million news and
152. Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine
Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1013 (2009).
153. NAT'L BIOSURvEILLANCE ADVISORY SuBcomm., IMPROVING THE NA-
TION's ABILITY To DETECT AND RESPOND TO 21ST CENTURY URGENT HEALTH
THREATS: FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE ADVISORY SuB-
COMMITTEE 9 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/osels/pdf/NBAS%20
Report%20-%200ct%202009.pdf.
154. Google Dengue Trends, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/den-
guetrends/.
155. David Van Sickle, The Next Generation of Public Health Approaches to
Asthma in Asia and the Middle East, 22 AsIA-PACIFIcJ. PUB. HEALTH 229S, 231S
(2010).
156. Beyea, supra note 150, at 980.
157. Choi & Varian, supra note 141, at 7-8.
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blog articles to show both how contemporaneous "memes"-
"short, distinctive phrases that travel relatively intact through
on-line text"-compete with each other and how the diffusion
of information across the Internet is achieved.15 8
But the emergence of extremely large datasets has
presented novel problems and questions for investigations of
social relations and social networks. In one sense, this is almost
redundant-each investigation of cell phone usage, Web sites
visited, or search query patterns necessarily discloses some-
thing about users' interests and motivations. On the other
hand, researchers have uncovered patterns that delve far more
deeply into users' interests. Jure Leskovec's work quantifying
how social networks affect purchasing decisions is one exam-
ple.1 59 Leskovec examines the influence of buyers upon each
other and buyer-seller trust in the context of a large data set
gleaned from Taobao, a Chinese e-commerce site, concluding
that the greatest influence upon a user's decision to buy some-
thing is the user's previous communication through the site's
social networking tool, and not the price or the seller rat-
ing.160 In a separate study, Leskovec compares European cell
phone data with two social networking sites that allow users to
"check in" at specific locations, concluding that while most
user travel can be explained by periodic tasks and static rou-
tines, long distance travel is correlated with visiting a far-away
friend.161
The personal nature of many of these inquiries makes it
easy to see how Europeans concerned about the implications
of technology for civil liberties and human dignity might
worry; however, these predictive qualities also make user data a
potential trove of information for law enforcement officials
158. Jure Leskovec et al., Meme-Tracking and the Dynamics of the News, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 497, 497 (2009), available at http:/
/dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1557077&bnc=1.
159. Jure Leskovec et al., The Role of Social Networks in Online Shopping: Infor-
mation Passing, Price of Trust, and Consumer Choice, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
12TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 157, 157 (2011), available
at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1993598&bnc=1.
160. Id. at 166.
161. Jure Leskovec et al., Friendship and Mobility: User Movement in Location-
Based Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 1082
(2011), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2020579&bnc=1.
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who seek to predict and prevent crimes. One of the most la-
mented post-9/11 surveillance programs, Total Information
Awareness (TIA), explicitly called for "very large scale
databases covering comprehensive information about all po-
tential terrorist threats."'62 TIA's innovation was to use both
private enterprise information as well as government databases
to create a more holistic picture of surveillance targets, and
then use link analysis tools to come up with portraits of sus-
pects. 163 After John Poindexter, the former head of the Infor-
mation Awareness Office, resigned in 2003, the TIA was
defunded and the NSA took over at least two of the TIA's
projects.164 One was the "Information Awareness Prototype
System," which was described in the initial TIA call for propos-
als as "an end-to-end, closed-loop prototype system to aid in
countering terrorism through prevention by integrating tech-
nology and components from existing DARPA programs."165
The second program that NSA adopted was called "Genoa,"
later "Topsail," the goal of which was "to develop decision-sup-
port aids for teams of intelligence analysts and policy person-
nel to assist in anticipating and pre-empting terrorist threats to
U.S. interests."166 In this context, a "database" was "a new kind
of extremely large, omni-media, virtually-centralized, and se-
mantically-rich information repository that is not constrained
by today's limited commercial database products . . .. Innova-
tive technologies are sought for treating these databases as a
virtual, centralized, grand database."167
"Data mining" is not the only technology at play here-
other tools, including link analysis, pattern matching, and net-
work surveillance, are gaining currency as well.' 68 Moreover,
162. EPIC Analysis of Total Information Awareness Contractor Documents, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 2003), http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/doc_
analysis.html.
163. Shane Harris, Two Controversial Counter-Terror Programs Share Parallels,
Gov'T ExEc. (Jun. 16, 2006), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0606/0616
06nj1.htm.
164. Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, NAT'LJ., Feb. 23, 2006, at 66, available at
http://shaneharris.com/magazinestories/tia-lives-on/.
165. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 162.
166. Harris, supra note 164, at 67.
167. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 162.
168. See Open Letter from the Exec. Comm. on Ass'n for Computing
Mach. Special Interest Grp. on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, "Data
Mining" Is NOT Against Civil Liberties (June 30, 2003), http://www.sigkdd.
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information about data mining, which is often disclosed under
the Privacy Act, does not include other tools such as link analy-
sis, which are sometimes equally or more important as data
mining narrowly defined. Broadly, however, it is clear that the
analysis of large data sets is now at the core of the American
intelligence enterprise. The NSA reportedly employs a "high-
volume, automated voice recognition and pattern matching
system" to filter the content of international calls on which it
eavesdrops. 69 With the cooperation of service providers, NSA
also monitors Internet traffic, including web browsing, using
optical splitters within telecom facilities that duplicate the data
stream and send a copy to NSA.1 70 In addition to its other real-
time monitoring capabilities, NSA may also use third-party
data mining software to establish the location and online iden-
tity of a suspect. NSA has developed some real-time monitor-
ing capabilities with regard to detecting cyberattacks,171 in-
cluding the "Perfect Citizen" initiative to detect attacks on crit-
ical infrastructure networks such as the electricity grid.172
Although Perfect Citizen focuses on operators of essential util-
ities, it leaves open the option of expansion to other parts of
the private sector. In addition, utilities may allow NSA to moni-
tor the technology on their networks, or may choose to deploy
the technology themselves.
org/civil-liberties.pdf ("Data mining is but one of many technologies that
may be used in these projects. Other technologies include database manage-
ment, online analytical processing, speech recognition, image (face, iris, fin-
gerprint, etc.) recognition, natural language understanding and translation,
data warehousing, data integration, information retrieval, etc. Does it make
sense to attempt to outlaw any or all of these?").
169. Jon Stokes, The New Technology at the Root of the NSA Wiretap Scandal,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 20, 2005, 1:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/old/con-
tent/2005/12/5808.ars.
170. Ellen Nakashima, A Story of Surveillance, WASHINGTON PosT, Nov. 7,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/
07/AR2007110700006.html.
171. Bruce Gabrielson, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Presentation at the 6th Annual IT Security Automation Conference and
Expo: Progress in Near-Real Time Attack Detection at the Platform Level
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://scap.nist.gov/events/2010/itsac/presentations/
day2/NetworkAutomation-ProgressinNear-RealTimeAttackDetection
at thePlatformLevel.pdf.
172. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies, WALL
ST. J., July 8, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748704545004575352983850463108.html.
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Finally, the TFTP case is a classic example of intelligence
agencies' reliance upon databases recording communications
and transactions, including phone, text messaging, email, and
financial transaction records.173 The real question is how NSA
analyzes the data once it has obtained it. In 2004, the General
Accounting Office issued a report on the prevalence of data
mining in U.S. federal agencies. The report found that 52
agencies were using data mining techniques, many of which
relied on data shared between agencies or between the private
and public sectors. The NSA did not respond to the survey.174
Speculation abounds that the NSA is using social network anal-
ysis tools to analyze connections between people, transactions,
and communications.1 7 5 The NSA potentially uses its own
software to do so, but it may be as likely that the agency turns
to commercial solutions, which are often cheaper and
faster.176
B. Global Regulation of Data Mining
As is clear, bulk data is a valuable commodity for both pri-
vate and public actors, and it invites privacy concerns about
aggregation as well as about data subjects' consent, anonymity,
and usage. And those concerns seem more concretely ad-
dressed in the European framework-which confers enforcea-
ble rights to access, amend, control, and delete one's data-
173. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans'Phone Calls,
USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2006-05-10-nsa-x.htm (investigating the extent of phone record
databases maintained by NSA); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILIY OFFICE,
GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES,
2 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf (citing
credit reports and credit card transactions as examples of data mining by
federal agencies).
174. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILIY OFFICE, supra note 173, at 7.
175. Alexander Dryer, How the NSA Does "Social Network Analysis," SLATE
(May 15, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2141801/; Kim Zetter, NSA
Whistleblower: Wiretaps Were Combined with Credit Card Records of US. Citizens,
WIRED (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/nsa-
whistlebl-1 /.
176. See, for example, the Department of Homeland Security's decision
to turn to commercially available software instead of their in-house ADVISE
data-mining software because the commercial product was cheaper. Anne
Broache, Report: DHS Kills Data-Mining Project, CNET (Sept. 6, 2007), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9773243-7.html.
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than in the United States framework, whose "notice and con-
sent" and "harm-based" models are far more skeletal and reli-
ant on industry self-regulation. In other words, the collection
of this type of data, even before it is put to suspect use, is the
subject of real concern in the European legal community.
Moreover, the European data protection framework-by
virtue of its extraterritorial reach-has served to "ratchet up"
privacy protections in other areas of the world.177 By forcing
companies to pay the heightened costs of protecting privacy in
multiple legal regimes, the European norms governing data
privacy have diffused, to some extent, to transnational busi-
nesses based in the United States. In some sense, this goes
hand in hand with the purpose of the Directive-achieving
uniformity and consistency among legal regimes in Member
States. By virtue of Article 25's adequacy requirements, a de-
gree of consistency among the European states and its exter-
nal trading partners now seems not only desired but also at-
tainable. Even if this adequacy determination takes place on a
case-by-case basis-as was the case with the TFTP agreement-
rather than as a general matter, it is clear that the European
data privacy rules have the capacity to force less-protective na-
tions to, in some sense, comply. Exporting privacy is a key pur-
pose of the European data privacy regime.
In light of these concerns, balanced against the existing
(and growing) analysis capabilities, the TFTP agreement's al-
lowance of bulk data transfers juxtaposed with its prohibition
on "computer filtering" is curious. 78 One interpretation is
that Article 5 has been craftily worded so as to allow the de-
sired analysis capabilities while seeming to prohibit all auto-
mated data analysis. 179 If this is the case, it might speak to the
fact that while data mining has a bad reputation in civil liber-
ties circles, the use of computerized techniques to filter mas-
sive amounts of data is now a fact of life.180 In 2006, the Ger-
177. See generally Shaffer, supra note 34.
178. Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 2, 6.
179. This may be the case because searching a data set of millions of trans-
actions is literally impossible without some form of "computer filtering." Be-
cause the term is undefined, however, it is unclear which forms of "com-
puter filtering" are prohibited.
180. See Exec. Comm. on Ass'n for Computing Mach. Special Interest Grp.
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, supra note 168 ("[T]he current
debate that portrays these Government projects as 'developing massive data
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man Constitutional Court held that data mining was only per-
missible in the event of a "concrete danger."181 Admitting that
computerized searching is taking place in the context of intel-
ligence-gathering, rather than a specific investigation, is tanta-
mount to conceding that a "concrete danger" exists with re-
gard to terrorism-although this threat is by definition gen-
eral, not individuated. It is thus possible that although Article
5 seems to prohibit all automated analysis, computer-aided
searching goes on uninhibited under a different name. The
JSB's contention that the Treasury's requests continue to be
incredibly vague seems to indicate that this is the case-cer-
tainly, Treasury does not have the manpower to filter through
literally millions of results without computerized assistance.
Another possibility is that the Agreement in Article 5, in
the context of the European data privacy regime more gener-
ally, is actually attempting to set some kind of standard on use
of cross-border bulk data transfers. 1 2 Indeed, one argument
in favor of the development of a European Terrorist Finance
Tracking System is that it would avoid the evil of having to
transfer the data to a third country.s83 However, since the
main benefit of having bulk data-rather than data collected
based on individualized suspicion-is that the sheer quantity
of information makes it ripe for computer-aided analysis, it is
unlikely that a European version of the TFTP would not use
data mining or analysis techniques. 184
Hesitancy about the usage of bulk data is rooted in sub-
stantive concerns about necessity, proportionality, and aggre-
mining systems' is misleading and injurious to the large scientific commu-
nity working on the research and development of data mining technol-
ogy.").
181. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BVerfGE 1 158 (Ger.) ("Diese Voraussetzungen sind bei der
Rasterfahndung gewahrt, wenn der Gesetzgeber den Grundrechtseingriff an
das Vorliegen einer konkreten Gefahr far die bedrohten Rechtsgfiter
knfipft.").
182. See generally Shaffer, supra note 34 (arguing that the European regime
on privacy standards is leading to the creation of national standards).
183. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN TERRORIST FINANCING
TRACIGNG PROGRAMME RoADMAP 2 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
governance/impact/planned ia/docs/201 1_home_003_terrorist financing
tracking-en.pdf (stating the goal of being able to filter the banking data
within Europe so as to provide more "targeted data" to the Treasury).
184. Id.
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gation.185 Because of the sharply divergent statutory
frameworks and privacy norms in the EU and United States, it
would be difficult to obtain consensus on how to use large
quantities of data in privacy-protective ways. The online behav-
ioral advertising approach is illustrative; where objectors to be-
havioral advertising in the United States use ad-hoc methods
to block ads, the European E-Privacy Directive is meant to pro-
vide a blanket limitation on use of consumer data for advertis-
ing purposes.186 This example does not entail data transfer for
additional purposes, which would further complicate the pic-
ture. Yet the policies are so different as to make it difficult to
see what kind of normative agreement would facilitate respon-
sible data transactions.
Perhaps what European-style regulation can best achieve
is to implement a framework for data subjects to access, cor-
rect, and have control over their data, regardless of their na-
tion of citizenship and the nation that is requesting or ob-
taining the data. But even in this relatively limited scenario,
which the TFTP embodies, the difficulties of achieving global
agreement on this issue have been legion, showcased (as dis-
cussed above) by the lack of redress and review mechanisms.
Yet as the information society continues to grow and shift, al-
ready copious quantities of data will also continue to grow, and
procedures for dealing with them are paramount.
185. See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at Article 5
(ensuring necessity and proportionality by requiring that data be "adequate,
relevant, and limited to the minimum necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they are processed"); see also United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259
(U.S. Jan. 23, 2012) (Sotomayor,J., concurring) ("[T]he Government's un-
restrained power to assemble data that real private aspects of identity is sus-
ceptible to abuse . . . . GPS monitoring-by making available at a relatively
low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any per-
son whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track-
may 'alter the relationship between citizen and society . . ."') (citing United
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concur-
ring)).
186. See, e.g., France Introduces Prior Opt-in Consent for Cookies, PRIVACY AND
INFORMATION SECURITY LAw BLOG (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.huntonpriva-
cyblog.com/2011/08/articles/france-introduces-prior-opt-in-consent-for-
cookies/#more-1869 (reviewing French implementation of E-Privacy Direc-
tive by imposing opt-in consent requirements for cookies, which are neces-
sary for targeted or behavioral advertising).
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One solution may be to conceptualize data as a good that
can be traded in and to erect an international framework
around it (paralleling, in some way, the TRIPs Agreement, for
example). This solution, at the very least, would acknowledge
the crucial role that data transfer has played and will continue
to play in building the international economy. On the other
hand, it would also probably subjugate privacy concerns to ec-
onomic ones. Moreover, since the issue here is not trade of
data among corporations, but rather a one-way transfer from a
corporation to government, conceptualizing data transfers as a
form of international trade is probably not the correct frame-
work. 187
A more effective solution may be to empower more actors
in this area to contract for adequate data protection and trans-
fer. Contracts, as the European system anticipates, play a cru-
cial role in incorporating data protections while facilitating us-
age.188 The costs of complying with European regulations on
one side of the Atlantic and American regulations on the
other have also fostered a market for self-regulation and pri-
vacy labeling programs that can, along with contract terms,
help guarantee that private enterprises take privacy more seri-
ously.189 Contracts can also govern relationships among a vari-
ety of types of actors, including public, private, and hybrid.
Empowering European companies to contract with the Ameri-
can government, while maintaining the threat of enforcement
of European law, might raise the standard of data protection
overall by forcing key stakeholders in the United States to
187. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, pmbl. (noting that the
"free movement of goods . . . require[s] ... that personal data should be
able to flow freely," and hence distinguishing between the movement of
"goods" and "data"); see Shaffer, supra note 34, at 50 (discussing the potential
role of the WTO in adjudicating data transfer disputes, and concluding that
the EU has a legitimate public policy rationale to restrict data transfers to
protect its citizens).
188. Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Coun-
tries, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/doc-
ument/international-transfers/transfer/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2013).
189. See, e.g., TrustE, http://www.truste.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013)
(providing online privacy solutions to businesses); BBB Accredited Business
Seal for the Web, BETTER BUSINEss BuREAu, http://www.bbb.org/us/bbb-on-
line-business/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) (offering certifications of compli-
ance with privacy policies).
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comply with European law. However, the balance of power will
always be uneven when government requests information from
private industry, especially in light of the counterterrorism ra-
tionale. In addition, the exchange of large sets of aggregate
data would probably continue to anger European citizens and
lawmakers.
CONCLUSION
This Note aims to showcase the limited capabilities of the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program as a means to regulate
global data transfers. Although the normative divergences be-
tween European and U.S. privacy law are far fewer than the
dominant literature suggests, the procedural differences are
extensive. This makes it very difficult to come up with a regula-
tory regime whose procedural protections actually have teeth,
despite the fact that the European data protection framework
has generally achieved a "ratcheting up" of data protection
standards.190 The result is that while the European predilec-
tion for procedural protections won out in this case, the imple-
mentation has been highly flawed. Moreover, whether bulk
data transfers, and the privacy implications for aggregated
consumer data analyzed through emerging technology, are sui
generis remains unsolved. Yet despite its flaws, the TFTP is one
of the only attempts to develop an international regulatory
framework for dealing with transfers of data-a commodity
that is essential not just to commerce but also to government
functions. Its gaps suggest both the difficulties of coming up
with a more comprehensive framework, and the imminent
need to do so.
190. See Shaffer, supra note 34, at 55-56 (describing the attention that Eu-
ropean privacy protections have drawn to the practices of American busi-
nesses).
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